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I t 4 ~~ -
Many of us are disturbed qy the situation in the 
Far East. Things have happened there which have shocked and 
confused us. We are faced with an almost constant necessity 
of adjusting our thinking to new developments in that area. 
\.Je cannot retreat from these developments. Nor can 
we strike out blindly at them in the vain hope that precipitous 
action will alter their course. Either way is the irresponsible 
way. And the gravest danger of the moment lies not so much in 
the situation in Asia itself but in the irresponsibility in our 
own midst--the irresponsibility that ignores complex problems 
and feeds confusion; that spreads panic where the need for calm 
is greatest; that hampers efforts to cope effectively with dif-
ficulties abroad. 
If we can get beneath the smokescreen raised by this 
irresponsibility, I think we wilJ find that the basic problem 
of ~ American Far Eastern policy is the same problem that 
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confronts us in all foreign policy. It is, first, the problem 
of identifying our own national interests--not the interests of 
the British or the Indonesians or the Chinese--but the interests 
of the United States. Then, having done that , it is a problem of 
acting as a group--a bipartisan group, I hope--in a manner best 
calculated to safeguard those interests. J( 
It is important, therefore, to restate the fundamental 
reasons for our concern with the Far East. We are interested in 
that area, in the first place, because all of us realize that it 
has a very important relation to our own security. Security, 
however, is not merely a question of whether we have one base off 
the mainland of Asia or two or three or four. Bases are factors-
-important factors in security--but except to the inflexible arm 
chair strategists, they are by no means the whole story. 
It is possible to have all the bases and still lose a 
war as the Japanese discovered in China. On the other hand, it is 
possible to begin with practically none of them and win one as we 
lately demonstrated in the Pacific. I say this,not because I wish 
to minimize the importance of military considerations in foreign 
policy, but because it is necessary that we do not fall into a 
Maginot Line type of thinking about Formosa or any other position 
in Eastern Asia. Our peacetime Far Eastern policy, of course, must 
aim in part at the maintenance of an integrated defense system in 
the ~/estern Pacific. But our policy cannot be expected to give us 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 53, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 3 -
there, anymore than it can· give us elsewhere, absolute security 
in a military sense. 
In the long run, it seems to me that we stand to gain 
much more in terms of national safety if our policies in the Far 
East are directed towards retaining the faith of Asia's voiceless 
millions in the integrity and the friendship of the United States. 
In addition to considerations of security, we also have 
long-standing economic and cultural interests in the Far East. 
We must not overlook them because in a world of growing interde-
pendence they should assume increasing significance. 
If we are to pursue policies which safeguard our interests 
in the Far East it is essential that we understand the situation as 
it now exists in that part of the world. Not the situation which 
wishful thinkers like to believe exists. Not the situation as it was 
in the 19th Century or even as it was as late as 1945. But the naked 
reality of the Far East in 1950. 
The keynote of Asia today is change--change compounded in 
almost equal parts of a determination to end foreign domination and 
a revulsion against misery as the normal condition of life. Asians 
are sick and tired of having their countries run for them. They are 
sick and tired of unnecessary privation and suffering. They insist 
upon the right to control their national lives. And they insist that 
their own leaders show a willingness and a capacity to deal with such 
basic questions as mass hunger and sickness. 
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That is the substance of the situation in the Far East 
today. It would be readily evident to all except for the intrusion 
of the Soviet Union. The ~ussians did not create the changing circum-
stances in Asia, but they are fishing in the confusion to see what 
can be caught in the way of material aggrandisement and increased 
world power. The actions of Soviet imperialism have already reversed 
the trend in China from national independence back toward foreign 
domination. 
In calculating our Far Eastern policy, it is necessary to 
recognize that the black shadow of Soviet imperialism obscures the 
entire situation. But we must not, because of the shadow, lose 
sight of the substance. We must not be content merely with blind 
opposition to communism in the Far East. We oppose that ideology 
because we know only too wel l from what has happened in Eastern Europe 
and what is happening in China that it is wholly inconsistent with 
the goals of independence and progress. 
We have traditionally given positive support to these aspira-
tions in the Far East--~n the Philippines and China, and more recently, 
in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia. We have supported them not merely 
because we believe that they are worthwhi le and decent objectives in 
themselves, but also because we believe that it is in our own interests 
to do so. Free peoples who are striving peacefully to improve their 
lot are friendly peoples. They are peoples who may be counted on ~ 
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in promoting genuine collective security and a more stable and 
fruitful world. 
The basic principle of our Far Eastern policy, therefore, 
should remain what it long has been--support of the peoples of 
As i a in their desire to obtain or to protect their independence 
and to improve their way of life. In giving such support, however, 
we must consider the total needs of the Free World and the limited 
resources which we have available for meeting them. We must also 
choose the type of support--whether it be diplomatic, financial, 
military or any other--to fit the specific need. And finally we 
must be certain that the native governments through which aid is 
extended possess the capacity to use it effectively. 
We need only to review events in China during the past 
few years to realize such assistance as the United States can give 
in itself 
is not sufficien~to guarantee the triumph of freedom in the Far East. 
During the war and immediate postwar period, the United States poured 
to 
billions of dollars into China. We sent General Marshall/help the 1 
Chinese straighten out their dirriculties. He went to assist in ~ 
~ ~·..bV'\'.Y 
achieving what had long been the Generalissimo 1 s own policy--tfhe ~ ~_,J- fJ 
peaceful solution of the internal Chinese problem of unity. Even ~~ 
~/ when peace proved impossible we continued to support the National 
Government with a militarJ mission and with some half billion dollars 
more of economic and military aid. Some have charged that Chiang's 
colJapse was due to the inadequacy of American aid or to the Yalt a 
Agreement. The fact is that largely through the influence and help 
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of the United States, China enjoyed, at the end of the war, a 
greater degree of freedom from foreign control and a more eminent 
international position than ever before in her history. Furthermore, 
our military intelligence reports tell us that in December, 1945, 
the Government of Chiang Kai-shek had obtaine~ with American assistance, 
an overwhelming advantage over the Communists. Yet, exactly three yegs 
later, this preponderance had been lost and the defeat of the Nationalist 
armies on the mainland had become inevitable. 
Or to the 
officials 
Marshall, 
Was this colossal failure due to any lack of American aid? 
Yalta Agreement? We have the answers not only from our civilian 
in China~r~our expert military observers--from Generals 
~-u..... ~~If!. 
~ledemeyer and Barr A Tlle primary respansi hi J.ity for the co~se 
~anahly.-!'esteEi u:ooB tfie inability or thE!: umn.ll1ngness of tho 
C_9.ineJso GoverrJment. to make the nocosstr;y reforms v.·fiieh alone could.--
haYe retained for it the suppm: t of the nation. The nationalist letrerers 
w~e not defeated by the C amwmists. 'fhey were defea Led by their own 
~ruption and incompetence. 
I 
There would be no point in underscoring these unhappy develop-
ments in China except that they point up the necessity for recognizing 
what we can and what we cannot do in our r elations with the Far East. 
There is no virtue in doing in foreign affairs just to be doing . And 
there are situations in which inaction is preferable to ill-advised action . 
The first thing that we cannot do is to assume primary res-
ponsibility for the solution of the internal problems of any major 
Far Eastern country. The peoples of those nations do not want and 
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will not acquiesce in solutions which come about primarily through 
foreign intervention. For the United States to intervene in Formosa, 
for example, would be resented by the Chinese people at this time just 
as they are learning to resent Soviet intervention. It might win for 
us the gratitude of a few hardpressed leaders of the Kuomintang, but in 
the last analysis, it would evoke the same enmity that the Russians 
are creating for themselves by their domination of the Peking 
Government and by their activities in Manchuria, Sinkiang and 
Mongolia . 
By the same token we cannot make ourselves responsible-
-militarily or otherwise--for regimes which, because of their 
failure to deal effectively with the problems of their peoples , 
have only the most dubious popular support. 
What we can do in the present circumstances is to continue 
-------
to support in an appropriate manner desirable changes which are 
taking place in the Far East. 
We can assist those governments which command the reasonable 
respect of their citizens to strengthen the internal stability of 
their countries and their capacity to resist aggresion. 
We ~ keep the attention of the world focused relentlessly 
on the unscrupulous, self-seeking Soviet imperialism in the Far East. 
We can seek appropriate ways to frustrate the effort of 
the present Communist masters in Peking to push the peaceful Chinese 
people into aggressive adventures beyond China's borders. 
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We can encourage movements of the Far Eastern peoples 
designed to promote regional unity. 
Finally, we can keep our thinking on general foreign policy 
--------
flexible. Only in this way will we be able to act appropriately in 
any given circumstances. Above all, we must avoid the ~allacy of 
believing that consistency in foreign policy lies in acting precisely 
in the same manner in every part of the globe. It is, for example, 
fantastic to suggest that what we have done in Greece we must also 
~/ 
do in China, which has ~ times as many people, 60 times as great an 
area, and a vastly different set of political and strategic problems. 
The only consistency we need be concerned with is that with 
which we devote ourselves to the protection of the security and all 
the legitimate interests of the United States. That is the basic 
ingredient of a nonpartisan, nonpolitica+ approach. Beyond it let 
us exercise a litt le imagination and a great deal of discretion. 
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Many of us are disturbe by t l e situation in the 
Far B st. tlhin ;s have happened there which h ve sl.ocked. and 
" 
confused us . We are faced with an almost constant neces&rity 
of adjustin our thinking to new develo menta in th t urea. 
e cannot retreat from these developments . Nor can 
we strike out blindly at them in the vain hope that precipitous 
action Will alter their course . Either way is the irresponsible 
way . And the ·ravest danger of the moment lies not o much in 
the sit·c< tion in Asia 1 tsel:r but in the irresnonsibllity in our 
own midst--the irresponsibility that 1gnoreo convl x problems 
and feeds confusion; that e re·ds panic where the need for ca lt!l 
is greatest; th t ha ers efforts to cope effectively with dif-
ficultles abroad . 
If we can get beneath the smokescreen raieed by this 
irresponsi 1li ty 1 I think we wil.l find that tLe bas ic p roblem 
of ,A.'Tlerican Par Ea"tern policy 1e the .arne roblem thut confronts 
us in all forei n ;'Olley . It is, first, t he 'roblem 
ot identifying our own national interest- - not the interestsor 
the Br1 tiah or the Indonesians or the Chinese- - u.t the interests 
of the United States . Then , h u.v1ng cione that, 1 t is a. proolE.m or 
acting as a group- -a bipartisan group , I hope- - 1n a manner best 
calculated to saregJard those interests . 
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.If ~~ ke th s~ t.cts 4 n rnlnd, o ohn1l !1nd, 
I bel1ove, that tho ~ ... ~o~·~ 1,.~a-- ~ t.t • r r;:~hnll 
nn Sec:r'e';.E ry tcheP.onN 1r1 "' H <.1. •• i'.if't1·. t.i .n cf .Preoident Tr, n 
has been on the n:-ne '11- ·-,artiaan tr. clt pur. t,~~CI )y aar:ln-
1stra.tion nfter aam1n1"' tration--lte.! ubliC< n and De,- ocr·at-- d rin 
the naat h.ru!'-century . It shoL.l be ke t on th t tr< ck 
dee)it tlte efforts ot' those, w o for re:.son of sont1 en .. -.ity or 
pol1t1cs, would d.r· :1.1 it. 
It 1s !J#portant, ther fore, to re• tate :the fund ent .... .l 
reasons for our concern w1 Lh the Fttr "" o t. . \ e are 1n teres ted ln 
th t a.r a, in the ftret --l ~ce, because all o:t' us reali~e th t 1 .. 
has a very important relation to our own secn.trt ty . Seouri tY, 
however, ia not merely a question or uhether we have one b s. off 
the mu1nland of Asia or two or three or !o\ r. BntH'~S nre :tao tors-
important factors in oecur1ty--but exonrt to the 1nflcx1ole arm 
It is noas1bl~ to ho.ve all the basea and still losa a. 
w r as th. Japan ae leoovered 1n Chin . On the other h\~d, 1t 1a 
oss1ble to begin vi th t>ract1c.'llly non ot them anc ... win one a.a we 
lately demonstrated in the Pao1f1c. l uay this, not becn~ne I ~ish 
to minimize the 1m• or•tanoo of rrt111 tary oono1d.eratlonn !n fm•ei 
-ool1cy, but l.>eoauae 1 t 1a nooessa.:ry tht:~.t we ao not fall into · 
Haginot ll.1ne trt-Je of thlnl..ine; o.bout i'ol"tnosa or any oth r pool tio, 
in ·as ... Grn Asia. ou.r t·eao time Far ..... a tern policy, of cour~e, met 
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ai in part t the a1ntenanco or n int ~Tated 4eten e ystem in 
the e torn ac1!1c. But oar polloy cannot be expected to ~ive us 
there, any ore than it oan 0 1ve us lsawhere , abaolut 
ln minit,ry sense . 
·.c r1 ty 
In the long run, it ae .s to e th t we atnnd to gain 
.._. 
uch mor in t rm of n~tionnl safety 11' our policies 1n the F 
star direct d toward~ r t, 1nln th~ f·ith or A&ia ' a vo1cele s 
c1111ons 1n the in• .. e 1 ty and the friendship of the U 11 ted States 
In d~ition to oona1derat1one o! security, we also h, o 
lon - stand1n, conomic and cultural ln~cre ts 1n the F 
e ust not overlook. them bee usc 1n a vorld. of rowin interd-
pendence they should e~um 1nor asing si nit'i.c ... no • 
It ve are to pursue pol1cie 4h1ch snre r our tnteroeto 
l.n tho F_.r -tit is essent1nl that w, un rstand tle situation s 
it no\1 e7.lsts 1n "h. t part or the world. . ot the s1 t· tion Which 
vlsh.tul hin er like to believe e .. i.ats . Not the e1t t1on as it as 
1n the 19th Century or even as 1 t vas as late D 191+?. But the naked 
r a11ty or th F r aat in 1950. 
The keynote of ASia to .ay iG ohan_e~-ohan oo J:~ounded 1n 
almost equal .1rts of a deteru ina.tlon to end rore1 n do in t1on nd 
a revulsion against misery na the normal oonai';;ion of lite. Asians 
-- - ~ ck and tired or l "'"v1ng their countries run tor- t. m. h Y are 
..._ .... " '"'· 
610 and t1r d. of unneoe snry pr1vat1 n nd st.~f!er1ng. T ey insist 
u·on tht"s r-1 ,ht to control the1r national 11vea. And they insist th t 
their o n lead ·rs show a Wlllin c s and a caNlC1 ty to de l 'With such 
bacls qu etlone s rna.e hun er and aiokner;s . 
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Tl at 1 the s beto.rc of the sit t1on 1n r t 
today . It woul be readily vi .nt to 1 xo t for t} ntrusi n 
of t!10 Soviet Union . Tho us i D 1d not or ·te th 0 ctroW!:-
eta ·cea in AG1a, r:; t t .ey re 1'1s1.1n in th t 
c n be oau ,l t 1n the way 0 . mnv l'i ., randis · 
Ycr·ld powe:t· . Th aCtions or Sovlet 1m!)u •ialiGm l. \'G ll.· y rever d 
tt.e '-len4 ir. h1n_ rrorn national 1ndepan once ba.ok. to· ru to 1 
dom1n .• tion . 
In Ca.loulatlng our Far Eaetorn policy, 1 t 1s nao s., y to 
recogn1r. that the black sha ow or Bov1et 1myer1Ell1sm o;seures the 
en.lre sltu1t1on . But we must not, bee uee of tl shadow, lo e 
aight of the nubstanoe . lie muct not b oontant merely w1th blind 
o oaiti n to communism in the 1i' l' • st . We oppo e thut 1d olo 
oec use we !mow only too Wo.t..l form lth t Las ~a pened 1n ... stern urope 
and what is h'l. pen1ng tn Chtna th. t ib.is wholly inconsistent with 
the oale of 1n .ep na.ence and ro re , • 
e hav Crn 1t1onully ivei ositive eu ort to th oe n p1r 
at1ona in the Far ;aet- in th Ph111pp1ncs nnd 0 in anu 1 or ' c-.. 
ently, in Ir oneoia and loewher in 1a. · o h ve u ort d thoo not 
merely cause we believe that they are wortk ile nn decent obJ ct1v G 
in tho solves, but al&o beca.une web 11eve t1at it 1 in our own in-
tereete to o so . Fr peo lee who re str1b1n pe cefully to improve 
their lot are friendly peopl e. e re.peo 1 s ho ay be cou t d 
on 
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• 
in promot1n en1une colleoti ve oec .trl t;y nd. noro at hlc nd 
trul ttul world. 
The basic prL1c1p1o of IJUr Far F~stern policy, therefore, 
ehoulo. remnin wL.at 1 t 1 ng has becn--su "'port of the peoples of 
s1a 1n tie1r esl~, to obtain or to protect their 1n~e endence 
and to 1 porve tlalr w y of ~1!. In givin suol ho ever, 
we · ust consider the total needs of the ~·roe Worl an the limit d 
resourc s Which we have available for meeting them. must also 
choose the t ype ot upport--whether it be diplooat1c , t1nanc1al, 
m111 tary or any other--to fit the &JDJaft.a opec1t1o n ad. And :t1nn111 we 
must e oert .. 1n that the native ov rnmento through vh1otl aid 1s 
extended po sao th. cap city to use it ert~~tively . 
We need only to r vie· avt'>n\.8 in Ohir:n durin .. he pa.at 
few years to re ize such aas113ta.nce tt~t the lJn! t~d Statoo OM glvq 
1s not suft1o1onv in itself tc gu r nte~ the tr1urn~h or traedom 1n the 
F' r ast . !.luring ths war ana .'1.mm~d1ate poct"A~r period, the United States 
poUl·e~ bll.l.io~ o or doll rs into Ch na.. e sent Oenero.l l rohall to hel 
the Chines etrai hte. out their d1ft1oult1es . He went to aa1at in 
aohl.evH1 what had long been tho Genera.l1aG1 .o •a own ol1oy-the 
p eaceful solutl• n of the intern 1 Chir,csu problem of unl ty . Even 
when pea.o~ proved impossible ve continued to support the Hatio a1 
Government ~ith a mi Litary m1sa1 n and with nome h lt billion dollars 
m.or·e of oonom1c and m111tary aid. Sor1o h ve ohe.rgeu tlnt 0.11ang •e 
to 
oollapG was ue to the 1nadequ•OY ot merioan aid or/theY lta 
reement . The fact 1e th. t lar.,ely through th~ lnf11uenoe and help 
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of the United States, China enjoyed, at the end of the war, a 
greater degree of freedom from foreign control and a more eminent 
international position than ever before in her history . Furthermore, 
our military intell~ence reports tell us that in December, 1945, 
the Goverrunent of Chiang Kai-shek had obtained, with American ass1etance, 
an overwhelming advantage ever the Communists . Yet,exactly three years 
later,thie prepond.eranoe had been lost and t1,1.e de f ea t ot the Nationalist 
armies on the mainland had become inevita le . 
tla.s ·· this oolossal f ailure due to any l ack of .1\merican aid? 
or to the Yalta Agreement? We have the anseres not only frcm our o1v1liam 
officials in China but also from our expert mili t nry observer s-- f:r~m Gener al s 
Marshall , Wedemeyer and Ba1·r . The primary r csponsibil1 ty f or t he col l anse 
unqestional,by rested upon the inability or t he unwL11ngnes s of the 
Chinese Government to make the necessary reforms which alone could 
have retained for it the support of the nation. The nationalist leaders 
were not defeated by the Communists . They wer defeated by t heir O\m 
corrup tion and incompetence. 
There would be no point in under scoring these unha 1py develop-
ments in China except tha t they point up the necersity for reoongnizing 
DUX:tKXiiJ%Ja:&xKxliii}I~Xi:Qixtit•JX}IcUl'..XXl'Ipx%UX1lBCa&U.JX~X 
what we can and what we c annot do in our relations with the b'ar E st. 
"' 
There 1s no virtue in do1n6 in foreign affairs just to be doing . And 
there are situations in which inaction is preferable to i l l-advised action. 
The first thing tha t we cannot do ls to assume primn.ry res-
~ons1bil1ty for the SGlut1on of the internal probl ems of any major 
Far Epstern country. The peoples of those nations do not want and 
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to eign intervention. b"'or the Un1 te Otn.tca to intel"Venc 1n Fon:1o a , 
for exanple, vould. be resented by the Chin se ,people at th1 t1 e j Gt 
as they o.re learn1n to r-a ant Dovict 1!1tervent1on. It might wa :for 
us the _ra.t1 tude of a !ei! hal'dp- es '}d le .d~rs of the Kuonint g~ but in 
the last .11· lysls, 1 t ·ould evoke the sace enml t.y th, t the "ue ,iann 
are creat1n tor thernselve~ by their do~1natlon o! the Peking 
Government and by th ir aot1v1t1es 1n •anohur1a, 81nk1ang nnd 
Mongolia. 
BY the same token wo cannot make ourselves respone1ble-
111tar1ly or othe~~1se-- for reBi .es wrich, because of th ir 
t 1lure to aal. eftaotlvely w1 th tho problems o! their p~oples , 
have only the moat dubious popul nu: port . 
We. c .... n assist those c;:overnment3 wl1ch oom. ~nd. t' ·~ 4 ea.e nnble 
.... 
respect or th>:~1r oi tizens to st.c. ongtn n the 1r.ter:anl :+ab1:.1 ty. of 
their countries and tll ir cap oi ty to I"Ctlint aggreelon . 
e cnn k ep the t~ttention o! the ·;orld focused rel .ntes ly 
_..,.,., .. 
on the una~ru?ulous , aelf- seeling Soviet 1mper1Rllsm in the F r . st . ,...,.. .... . 
we can seek propr1ate ways to trustrate the rrort or 
the present ~ommurlst masters 1n Pek.ln to push the peao~t'ul ~hineee 
people into ggr salve a v ntu es beyond China ' s boruerK. 
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